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ABSTRACT
The orthodox understanding of the fate of the demobilized Continental Army 
soldiers holds that extended military service disadvantaged men in their 
subsequent civilian lives. Supposedly, the men never regained the years of 
service to their country and paid the price in lost wages, social status, and 
marriage opportunities until the nation belatedly and niggardly offered meager 
pensions starting in 1819. In contradiction to prevailing historiography, this paper 
argues military service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders 
with skills critical to their postwar success when they moved to new communities 
as the nation expanded. Through a combination of long-term service, von 
Steuben’s manual and training program, and merit-based promotions, the 
Continental Army created a competent corps of sergeants, lieutenants, and 
captains. Their diaries and letters show the junior leaders understood the 
changes they had undergone while fighting in the war. When matched against 
the tenets written in von Steuben’s manual, there emerged a remarkable 
correlation. While militarily competent and tactically proficient in drill and 
maneuver, these junior leaders also left the army with skills they could transfer to 
civilian pursuits. While not profiting financially from their military service, the 
junior leaders used their newfound abilities to achieve political success at the 
local level and assist in the expansion of the Early Republic. The Continental 
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The Continental Army: Leadership School o f  the Early Republic
Introduction
The soldiers who fought for their country and returned home to build the middle class in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression and a World War earned the title “Greatest Generation” 
from some authors. These soldiers’ accomplishments fill numerous books. Magazines and 
journals still frequently publish articles celebrating and examining their wartime experiences and 
their impact on the United States. The majority were drafted and took up arms for only two 
years-from  1943 through mid-1945. The soldiers’ rapid demobilization after World War II was 
only one of a series of armed forces expansions and contractions in America’s history. These 
former military members, once they returned to work or went to college, learned new skills and 
enlarged the American middle class. They were not the first group of demobilized soldiers to have 
a positive impact on the growth of the United States. However, unlike the Greatest Generation, 
historians have overlooked the effect of the wartime service of Continental Army junior leaders 
and their contributions to the growth of the United States.
Over half of the twenty thousand soldiers who filed for pensions between 1818 and 1832 
moved from their recruitment locations to different states or regions in the early Republic.1 Some 
of them had achieved the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain before leaving the army.2 
Continental Army training turned them into junior leaders who took their skills into civilian life. 
Much like the biblical parable of seeds planted in good soil, the former junior leaders bore an 
abundance of good fruit when planted in their new communities. W ithout understanding the how 
and why of their contributions, one cannot fully grasp the remarkable story of the early Republic’s 
rapid expansion.
The orthodox understanding of the fate of the demobilized Continental Army soldiers 
holds that extended military service disadvantaged men in their subsequent civilian lives. The
1 Theodore J. Crackel, “Revolutionary W ar Pension Records and Patterns of American Mobility, 
1780-1830,” Prologue 16, no. 3 (Fall 1984); John Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War 
Veterans, M oral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1999), 218.
2 I use the term  “junior officers” or “leaders” to refer to sergeants, subalterns, ensigns, lieutenants, 
and captains.
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men never regained the years of service to their country and paid the price in lost wages, social 
status, and marriage opportunities until the nation belatedly and niggardly offered meager 
pensions starting in 1819.3 While soldiers appreciated the delayed gratitude, the paltry pensions 
scarcely made up for the lack of wages during the war or the payment in worthless Continental 
dollars. Until the past twenty years, the prevailing wisdom was that most soldiers who joined the 
Continental Army after 1775 did so in pursuit of the wages and were from the lowest economic 
classes.4 In other words, the men entered the Army poor, and when they left they were still poor, 
as well as physically and mentally broken, with little to show for their service. Almost no one got 
rich serving in the Continental Army. The costs in health and personal fortune exceeded any 
possible reimbursement from the government. Everyone from General George Washington to the 
lowest private had a tale to tell of the tremendous personal costs of serving in the Army. If the 
focus remained on the economic costs of service, it would be easy to generalize military service as 
disadvantageous to the individual. With the lost wages, health concerns, and mental toil, it would 
be hard to predict any sort of success for soldiers after the war. The evidence initially appears to 
support the orthodox view.
However, cases exist that do not fit the historiography. Individuals who should have 
remained stuck in their social station emerged as leaders in their communities. This is especially 
true of junior officers and noncommissioned officers who moved from their recruitment locations 
or hometowns. Individuals, who were supposed to be poor, broken, and distrusted by the 
population due to their service in the Continental Army, emerged as respected local leaders. Local 
communities elected and appointed these veterans to positions of responsibility such as sheriff, 
justice of the peace, selectman, councilman, representative, and mayor. While not worthy of state­
wide or national notice, these positions were essential to the formation of stable communities in 
the expanding early Republic and the veterans’ contributions should be recognized.
3 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 50.
4 Edward C. Papenfuse and Gregory A. Stiverson, “General Smallwood’s Recruits: The Peacetime 
Career of the Revolutionary War Private,” The William and M ary Quarterly, Third, 30, no. 1 
(January 1973): 117-132; Resch, Suffering Soldiers; John Sellers, “Military History of the 
American Revolution: Proceedings of the Military History Symposium (6th)” (United States Air 
Force Academy, October 10,1974). In the 1970s, the new social historians produced a 
historiography of the American soldier that accurately captures the economic situation of three 
regiments during various periods during the war: Maryland in 1782, New Hampshire in 1775- 
1782, and Virginia in 1778-1781.
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The proponents of “great m an” history duly recorded the exploits of Washington, 
Hamilton, and Greene. Historians have debated the relative merits of the militia and Continental 
Army and compared the strategies of Washington and the British.s Social historians have 
chronicled and explained the motivations of the average enlisted soldier and the Continental 
Army as a whole, but little work has been done on the junior leaders trained by the Army and 
their contributions to expanding the early Republic.6 This paper begins the overlooked story of 
the men who bridged the gap between the visions of the great men and ordinary men who lived 
with the results. These junior leaders took the lessons they learned in the Army and realized the 
vision for an expansion of the new nation dream t by the founding fathers. These junior leaders 
made the idea of a single country a reality for the early Republic. Without a template and with 
only a vision, the junior leaders employed their own ability to see the grander picture, managed, 
and led their new communities, and ensured a rapid growth of states in the years after the end of 
the war. Before examining their contributions to the early Republic, it is necessary to understand 
how they attained their skills.
5 Russell F. Weigley, History o f  the United States A rm y  (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
Inc, 1967), 62; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o f  War: A  H istory o f  United States 
M ilitary Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973), 4; Don 
Higginbotham, The War o f  American Independence: M ilitary Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 
1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1971), 93; Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth o f  
the Republic 1763-89, Revised Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 79. 
Weigley questioned the military competence of the Continental soldier. The soldier may have 
been brave, but he never measured up to the British soldier in term s of discipline and ability 
because of training and equipping shortfalls. In 1971, during the height of America's involvement 
in the Vietnam War and the success of the North Vietnamese Army's strategy against the South 
Vietnamese Army, Don Higginbotham emphasized the "Peoples' War" aspect of the American 
Revolution. In the aftermath of America's experience in Vietnam, Edward S. Morgan continued 
the theme of a “Peoples' W ar.”
6 Sellers, “Military History of the American Revolution,” 161,164; Charles Royster, A  
Revolutionary People a t War: The Continental Arm y and American Character, 1775-1783 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 373; Charles 
Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A  Social History o f  the Continental A rm y, 1775-1783 (New 
York: New York University Press, 1996), xiv. John Sellers presented work at the Military History 
Symposium in 1974 which analyzed the socio-economic backgrounds of three different 
regimental-sized units and led him to declare that the soldier in the Revolutionary War enlisted 
primarily from the lowest rung of society for economic reasons in hopes for a better life - one they 
did not achieve. In response to a question, he answered "I am not impressed by the patriotic 
fervor of the privates. I think they all acted overwhelmingly out of self-interest. I do not believe 
that they really fought with a true understanding of independence." Sellers also averred that they 
did not amount to much after the war since they did not improve their economic standing or place 
in society even though a great majority of them relocated after the war. Royster did an excellent 
job of questioning the false dichotomy proposed by the proponents of enlistment solely for 
economic reasons. Neimeyer' social history of the Continental Army argued that soldiers in the 
army were those "least able to resist the blandishments of a recruiting party."
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The first question should be, how typical are these individuals of demobilized soldiers in 
the early Republic? After all, someone had to be elected to serve in these community positions. 
Why veteran junior leaders and not someone else? Does anything distinguish these former 
officers from their contemporaries? Within any group of people, some are going to attain 
positions of greater trust due to natural ability, social class, or education. Did some select 
individuals overcome the disadvantages of military service and succeed in spite of the tremendous 
odds against them? Are these soldiers just random outliers from the historically established dregs 
of society who served in the Continental Army after the rage militaire passed in 1776? Or did 
something in their background provide the crucial edge for electoral success? Could there be some 
relationship between their military service and postwar service at the local level?
Junior leaders in the Continental Army experienced the war in a much different fashion 
than the average militia member or civilian who moved after the war. As officers and sergeants, 
they learned to lead men in difficult circumstances for extended periods of time.7 The Army 
provided training in the performance of their duties and rewarded success with promotion and 
more responsibility. Leaders dealt with individuals from disparate sections of the country. Their 
exposure to dissimilar peoples, landscapes, and ideas vastly exceeded the experience of the 
average citizen. Junior leaders with extensive experience on courts-martial panels served as 
justices of the peace in their new communities. Junior leaders with experience in establishing new 
camps and bivouac sites emerged as leaders in the establishment and organization of new towns. 
This would appear to be more than coincidence. If so obvious, why have historians not written 
about the advantages of military service for veterans in the growth of the United States? Why did 
previous historians overlook this issue?
Previous historians, by focusing on the senior leaders such as Washington, Greene, and 
others or on the enlisted forces as a whole, missed the advantage of military service for junior 
leaders. Individual biographers or editors of diaries have noted the postwar exploits and successes 
of their subjects, but no one has examined junior leaders as a cohort. Deterred by the relative
7 James Martin and Mark Lender, A  Respectable Arm y: The M ilitary Origins o f  the Republic 
1763-1789, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc, 2006), 69-77; Weigley, History o f  
the United States Arm y, 41; Charles Knowles Bolton, The Private Soldier Under Washington 
(New York: Trow Directory, Printing and Bookbinding Company, 1902), 70.
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scarcity of sources for enlisted soldiers as a whole, historians have not leveraged the available 
sources to their full potential. Reliance on pension applications and community legal records 
further limited their findings and conclusions. Pension records record only the last decades of the 
veterans’ lives, while town studies work only where a large sample of veterans existed in an 
established community. The most recent study of Continental Army veterans focused on a rigid 
community in New Hampshire and provided the genesis for this paper. John Resch’s thorough 
study of veterans from a single location contains a revelation that over half of the New England 
Continental Army soldiers moved to different states or sections of the country after the war. With 
a few notable exceptions due to physical or mental injuries, social status and the control of ruling 
families most likely had more impact on future success than service in the Continental Army 
instead of the militia forces. Drawing conclusions about the disadvantages of Continental Army 
service based on a New England town controlled by a few select families seems prem ature.8 The 
questions posited in the previous paragraphs and discrepancies in Resch’s conclusions furnished 
the impetus to further investigate the role of former Continental Army junior leaders as they 
migrated to new communities.
Military service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders with skills critical 
to their postwar success when they moved to new communities as the nation expanded. Neither 
the riffraff nor broken individuals, these junior leaders continued their contributions to the new 
nation by serving their new local communities in positions of trust. The skills in leading and 
managing people, forming bonds, and envisioning a larger vision of the United States learned 
while in extended service set them apart from their contemporaries. While not leading to 
economic success or riches for the individual, the expertise acquired in the Army enabled local 
political success that upends the current historiography on the Continental Army soldier after the 
war.
Sources & M ethodology
In order to validate the argument of the advantages of military service for local postwar
8 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 56. Resch’s excellent study of Peterborough, New Hampshire focused 
on one small community controlled by a few powerful families who originally founded the town a 
few generations earlier.
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civilian success, the paper will examine three periods of five individuals’ lives through their 
written words, extant records, and secondary sources. The five men are familiar to Revolutionary 
War scholars through their writings: Joseph Plumb Martin, Jerem iah Greenman, Ebenezer 
Denny, Samuel Richards, and Benjamin Gilbert. They all entered military service at the lowest 
enlisted ranks, and, through extended service, attained rank in the noncommissioned and 
commissioned officer corps. All but one all attained positions of trust and responsibility in 
locations away from their birth communities. The exception returned to his hometown and did 
well after the war. Their pre-war lives, wartime experiences and training, and postwar lives are 
investigated.
The paper examines the soldiers’ lives before entering the military to determine if pre-war 
experiences and conditions provided the equivalent skills acquired during military training. For 
example, were they successful businessmen, church officers, and sons of landed gentry, 
experiences which taught them how to manage men and women? Social class is also examined to 
speculate about their chance for advancement in their natal communities. The level of education 
is an important criterion. While all were literate, what was the extent of their formal schooling?^
In eighteenth-century America, access to capital and social class standing often allowed one to 
obtain positions of trust, regardless of talent or ability. As a m atter of practice, individuals with 
social standing and wealth received commissions of greater rank in the Continental Army and 
would not have served long, if at all, as sergeants and junior commissioned officers.10
Since military service and training forms the critical step in the argument, the process of 
developing leaders in the Continental Army receives additional explanation. Once the foundation 
is laid, each individual’s experience and growth are compared with contemporary standards and 
the individual’s words. The United States had a difficult task in forming a professional army 
capable of winning independence. After the rage militaire subsided in 1776 and militias proved 
ineffective in prosecuting the war, Congress and General Washington had to form a professional
9 United States. Continental Army, Regulations fo r  the Order and Discipline o f  the Troops o f  the 
United States. P arti. (Steiner, Melchior, printer., 1779), 130. Fortunately, literacy was a criteria 
for selection as a noncommissioned officer and officer.
10 Robert K. Wright, The Continental A rm y  (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006), 
44-
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army to serve for the duration.11 Creating a professional Army from scratch was no easy task. The 
differences between the professional British Army, the impact of Baron von Steuben’s manual, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of militia must be understood to fully comprehend the impact 
of military service and training on the chosen individuals.12 The recollections of first combat 
remained vivid for all the individuals and provided insight into the ability to deal with chaotic 
situations and persevere in their mission. All the individuals recorded impressions of good and 
bad leaders that affected their own exercise of power. Their growth in understanding the leader’s 
role and respect and love for the men entrusted to their care emerged from their letters and 
diaries. They all experienced the need for discipline and the careful application of justice to 
ensure a stable community. Campaigns took them far from their recruitment locations and 
exposed them to the diversity of people and customs in late eighteenth-century America. The 
skills in dealing with the variety of circumstances encountered while in leadership positions in the 
Army proved transferable to civilian lives.
It is all the more remarkable that skills obtained during service made success possible in 
local neighborhoods when one understands that the soldiers and junior officers were not looked 
upon favorably after the w a r .J3 It is also important to note that contemporary civilians did not 
hold the Continental Army and soldiers in great esteem. Acknowledgment of service in the Army 
would not have provided easy access to positions of power and trust. Soldiers, especially 
commissioned officers, were viewed with great mistrust by large swaths of the population in the 
years after the war.^ Most civilians distrusted the idea of the “man on horseback” and viewed
11 Martin and Lender, A  Respectable Arm y; Neimeyer, America Goes to War; Weigley, History o f  
the United States Army; Weigley, The American Way o f  War; Bruce Chadwick, The First 
American Arm y: The Untold Story o f  George Washington and the Men Behind Am erica’s First 
Fight fo r  Freedom  (Naperville, Illinois: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2005). The challenges have been 
documented in these and numerous other histories.
12 United States. Continental Army, Regulations. Baron von Steuben is the author of the first 
version of the Regulations. Like contemporary leaders, the paper refers to the regulations 
hereafter as von Steuben’s manual for the remainder of the paper.
x3 Resch, Suffering Soldiers; Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense o f  Honor: Service and Sacrifice in 
George W ashington’s A rm y  (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2004). Resch and Cox both document the low esteem most civilians held for Continental Army 
soldiers and especially commissioned officers after the war.
Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 3,4; William Doyle, Aristocracy and Its  Enemies in the Age o f  
Revolution (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2009), Chap 4. “Few Americans shared Scott’s 
belief that the Continental Army had won the war. Nor did most Americans share Scott’s 
conviction that regular soldiers deserved special honors and reward.(3)”; They [Continental Army
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standing armies with suspicion. Since service alone would have not guaranteed respect and 
election to positions of trust, there must have been something else that enabled them to overcome 
the stigma of having been a soldier, and to subsequently achieve success.
In order to determine the ingredients for success, the selected group of postwar lives and 
records are sifted through for evidence of application of lessons learned during military service. 
The records are also analyzed to see the impact of their success in destination versus natal 
communities. Postwar success is not defined in terms of financial riches. Several of the 
individuals suffered greatly in their economic pursuits after the war. They failed as farmers and 
merchants or lost vast sums of money during bad business ventures. Success is defined as gaining 
the trust of their associates to serve in positions of responsibility. These elected posts were not 
awarded based on wealth, but trust -  trust earned through the demonstration of skills mastered 
in the Army as junior leaders.
The small number of sources available for investigation might initially be thought to pose 
a p r o b le m .^  Fortunately, the targets of this inquiry required literacy for their positions. Junior 
leaders had to compose reports and understand written instructions. Several of them understood 
the importance of the endeavors upon which they had embarked and proceeded to keep written 
records. While noticeably sparse on issues of geopolitical strategy or long discourses on their 
motivations for fighting or enlisting, they are rich with anecdotes and observations on what they 
considered important. Even when some historians have downplayed the significance of the 
memoirs or diaries as overly preoccupied with the routine and deprivation of camp life, they still 
reveal keen insights into the growth and development of junior leaders. The pioneers of women’s 
history provided a methodology to examining seemingly insignificant details along with 
additional sources to provide a larger context and reveal more than was originally understood.
Diaries and memoirs composed after the fact can be criticized for the editing the author
soldiers] were no longer dangerous ‘hirelings and mercenaries’ who posed a threat to liberty. (4);
Doyle provides an excellent recounting of the founding of the Society of Cincinnati and the 
problems the Society caused for Continental Army officers’ reputations and motives.
^A lfred Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea P arty: M em ory and the American Revolution 
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999), 7; J.Todd White and Charles H. Lesser, Fighters fo r  
Independence: A  Guide to Sources o f  Biographical Information On Soldiers and Sailors o f  the 
American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Young states that there are at 
least 500 examples of accounts of Revolutionary W ar soldiers. The guide contains approximately 
500 of diaries, autobiographies, and letters of all ranks.
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undertook to cast himself in the best possible light, and thereby obscure his true feelings or 
actions at the time of the event. This acknowledged weakness can be a strength for the purposes 
of this exploration. One can reasonably assume authors included events they considered 
im portant to their military service and growth. This assumption becomes increasingly important 
when the memoir is composed after the army service, when the author highlights how his army 
past influenced his postwar success by accentuating events in his past that explain actions in 
civilian life. Through comparing the observations in the diaries and letters with the standards of 
training and education provided to Continental Army junior leaders as they assumed their duties, 
the soldiers’ writings divulge interpretations previously overlooked.
Fortunately, five of the best-known soldiers’ letters and diaries of the Revolutionary War 
were written by men who joined as privates, received promotions, and achieved a measure of 
postwar success. Other contemporary diarists, not as well known, will be occasionally referenced 
to reinforce the primary sources or provide clarification. The best known of these writers is 
Joseph Plumb Martin who joined as a private from Connecticut, served for seven years, mustered 
out as a sergeant, and served as a Maine selectman for twenty years.16 Jerem iah Greenman 
enlisted as a private in 1776 from Rhode Island, served eight years, became a lieutenant, and was 
later elected as justice of the peace in Ohio.1? Ebenezer Denny from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, signed 
up as a sailor on a privateer, later received an appointment to the commissioned officer ranks in 
the Army, and continued in the Army after the war on the northwest frontier. Upon leaving the 
service and relocating westward to Pittsburgh, Denny was elected a county commissioner, 
director of the bank, and Pittsburgh’s first mayor in 1816.18 Samuel Richards enlisted in 1775 
during the rage militaire and fought outside of Boston. He later reentered the Army as a 
commissioned officer and served until the end of the war. Upon leaving the Army, he served as a 
deacon at his local church and worked as the Postmaster General of Farmington, Connecticut, for
16 Joseph Martin, Ordinary Courage: The Revolutionary War Adventures o f Joseph Plumb 
M artin, ed. Martin James, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), x-xii.
x? Jerem iah Greenman, Diary o f  a Common Soldier in the American Revolution, 1775-1783: An  
Annotated Edition o f  the M ilitary Journal o f  Jeremiah Greenman, ed. Robert C. Bray and Paul E. 
Bushnell (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978), xxvii, 8.
18 Ebenezer Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer Denny: An Officer in the Revolutionary 
and Indian Wars, vol. 7, Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Pt. 2 (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott for the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, i860), 226-229.
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over thirty years.^ Benjamin Gilbert enlisted in 1775 from Massachusetts, attained the rank of 
Sergeant, and eventually appointed as a commissioned officer. He served for eight years. Gilbert 
moved to western New York and served as the Otsego county sheriff for eleven years and three 
terms as a New York assemblyman along with other positions in the area.20 These five individuals 
demonstrated success at the local political level after the war in contradiction to  the long-held 
image of the suffering soldier.
The method for determining the linkage to military service as junior leaders and the 
resulting postwar success is remarkably simple. The individuals’ biographical data and written 
words were compared with the training and education regimes instituted by the Continental 
Army, as well as postwar information on their careers. The written sources were investigated for 
examples of the growth in leading and managing people, forming bonds with soldiers from 
disparate parts of the country, and developing a larger, idealistic vision of the United States based 
on travels while on military operations. The diary entries and letters corroborate growth and 
understanding by what the soldier chose to record as important. With limited time and space to 
record notes on paper, only the most important thoughts were saved. The thoughts that occupied 
their days and minds flowed from their pens to paper. The notes served as triggers some turned 
into narratives after the war. Boring and routine ideas did not merit the effort to ensure 
recollection years later. While some historians may interpret the drudgeries of camp life as 
routine, an individual whose survival depended on execution of simple tasks had a different 
understanding. Preoccupations with weather and guard duty change to attention on mission 
accomplishment as the soldier assumed new responsibilities. By understanding the context of 
these entries at different times in their careers, one sees the development of junior leaders and 
their understanding of the change in their written words.
x9 Samuel Richards, “Personal Narrative of an Officer in the Revolutionary W ar,” United Service; 
a Quarterly Review o f  M ilitary and Naval A ffairs (1879-1905), August 1884, 200.
20 Benjamin Gilbert, Winding Down: The Revolutionary War Letters o f  Lieutenant Benjamin 
Gilbert o f  Massachusetts, 1780-1783:, ed. John W. Shy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1989), 101; Benjamin Gilbert, A Citizen-Soldier in the American Revolution: The 
Diary o f  Benjamin Gilbert in Massachusetts and New York, ed. Rebecca D. Symmes, New York 
State Historical Association Monographic Studies 2 (Cooperstown, New York: The New York 
State Historical Association, 1980), 16.
1 0
Prewar Lives
A brief review of the soldiers’ lives before the army does not identify any markers of 
distinction or foreshadowing of greatness. None of them was a member of the upper class, but nor 
were any of them destitute. Their lives before enlistment would not have made them  identifiable 
as deadbeats.21 All received the rudiments of an education and were literate. They had 
attachments to their communities and extended families. They were not wage laborers looking 
solely for sustenance when they originally enlisted.
Joseph Plumb Martin was only fifteen when he joined the Continental Army for the first 
time. His life before enlistment consisted of living with his grandparents while learning to be a 
farmer. He did come from respectable origins as his father was a Yale College graduate who 
pastored a num ber of churches; unfortunately, none of them very successfully. M artin’s father 
was constantly in dire financial straits, which is why Joseph ended up with his grandparents.22 
Martin would have probably inherited his grandparents’ farm or worked as a farmer. He likely 
would not have become rich given the dire prospects for farmers in New England due to overuse 
of land and dwindling plots for each succeeding generation. While he could have become a 
landowner and citizen, his prospects for economic success, marriage potential, or social 
advancement would have been limited. W hether he understood these facts is unknowable. Martin 
joined the Continental Army in time for the campaigns around Long Island and New York City.
Jerem iah Greenman preceded Martin into the Continental Army. Greenman was 
seventeen when he enlisted, but no record exists of his training for a trade. He was an only child 
whose father may have made his living by the sea given his residence in Newport, Rhode Island. 
Greenman’s education was rudimentary, but it was enough for him to refine his reading and 
writing in the army. The record indicates no exceptional social standing, ability, or connections 
that predicted success in his birth community. It may have been for the excitement of war or hope 
for some economic payoff to improve his prospects that Greenman decided to enlist. Greenman
21 Resch, Suffering Soldiers. Resch’s study is an excellent analysis of the socioeconomic 
background of soldiers during the war that disproves the conclusions of the 1970s. Resch 
identifies the Revolutionary War as a “peoples war” where all classes served in the military.
22 Martin, Ordinary Courage, vii-ix.
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joined in time for the assaults on Quebec during the winter of 1775.23
Ebenezer Denny followed a somewhat different path into the Continental Army. Born to a 
farmer south of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Denny appears to have possessed an adventurous streak. 
At the age of thirteen in 1774, he secured employment carrying dispatches from Fort Pitt. After a 
couple of close encounters with hostile Indians, he ended up working as a clerk in his father’s 
store. From the records, Denny’s father does not appear to have been successful as a m erchant.^ 
Denny learned of a ship which obtained a letter of marque and he volunteered for duty. His 
position as a sailor was similar to a private in the army. The captain eventually assigned him 
command of a watch, which would have had almost identical duties to a sergeant of the guard in 
any army unit. The voyage was successful, and Denny obtained a share of the prize money. Upon 
return, Denny was offered a commission as an ensign in the Pennsylvania regiment. The 
Pennsylvania regiment had just suffered one of the more serious mutinies in 1780, and the state 
was probably interested in reliable individuals. Denny’s uncle had raised a company in the early 
days of the war and was killed at the battle of Crooked Billet on May 1,1778. Denny may have 
been seen as a trustworthy choice by authorities, even at the age of nineteen. In spite of his 
adventures, he was not a hardened campaigner, as his initial responses to combat verified. He 
came from good family, but still had to succeed by his own endeavors. He did not come from 
wealth, and all his pursuits were designed to procure additional means for his family.25
Farmington, Connecticut, was the birthplace of Samuel Richards. Richards was twenty- 
one when he joined one of the initial volunteer levies on May 5,1775 that departed for action 
around Boston in the aftermath of Lexington and Concord.26 By 1776, he was a commissioned 
officer. Little is known of Richards’ prewar life. Articles written by his granddaughter in the late 
nineteenth century acknowledge that little is known of his life before military service.2? Richards 
mentioned that he grew up listening to stories of his father’s exploits during the siege of 
Louisburgh in 1745 and this served as the inspiration for writing down his Revolutionary War
23 Greenman, Diary, xiv-xv.
24 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f  M ajor Ebenezer Denny,7:209.
23 Ibid., 7:207-211.
26 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 202.
2? Sarah Richards Butler Woodward, “Two Connecticut Patriots,” Daughters o f  the American 
Revolution 3, no. 4 (October 1893): 374.
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memories. As a twenty-one year old, he should have already chosen a profession or occupation, 
but Richards never felt the need to mention it. Securing the Postmaster General position in 
Farmington indicated he leveraged military service and political patronage to obtain the job after 
discharge. Nothing indicated exceptional social class, wealth, or education to predestine him for 
distinguished service, had the war not come along. War and militaiy service changed his fortunes.
War changed Benjamin Gilbert’s fortunes as well. Gilbert came from a family that 
performed military service during the French Wars of the 1740s and 1750s. Gilbert’s father, 
Daniel, completed his service as a junior officer. While Benjamin’s father was a selectman during 
the initial hostilities with Great Britain, his primary occupation was farming. Benjamin Gilbert’s 
primary school education was elementary and he, like Greenman, was self-taught. Gilbert, 
nineteen years old, enlisted as a private in 1775 and marched off to Boston.28 Gilbert initially 
served as a private and sergeant for over four years before obtaining a commission as an officer in 
August 178o.29 Gilbert enjoyed drinking and consorting with prostitutes a bit too much and had 
some difficulty in making the transition from enlisted to commissioned officer^0 His diary as an 
enlisted man reveals someone who enjoyed the pleasures of the flesh and bottle and held little 
potential for distinguished service. His commanders did trust him with important posts, such as 
quarterm aster of the company. His success as the supply sergeant evidently put him in good stead 
with his commander when the time for letters of recommendation for promotion to the officer 
ranks arrived. Even so, Gilbert took almost twice as long as Greenman to make the leap from 
sergeant to ensign. While war quickly m atured Greenman in the eyes of his leaders, Gilbert took 
longer. Greenman’s exposure to more combat and captivity than Gilbert probably accelerated the 
process.
War changed individuals. That tru th  has not changed in the millennia of hum an history. 
The ill-effects included bodily harm, mental trauma, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
to name only a few. Combat also subjected individuals to stressful situations, and when survived, 
infused the person with newfound confidence in their abilities and potential. When lessons
28 Gilbert, Winding Down, 10-11.
29 Ibid., 19.
3° Ibid., 87. Gilbert's whoring and drinking are referenced in the letters he wrote to a friend on 
March 1,1783.
13
instilled by the Army resulted in the tangible benefit of surviving battle and accomplishing the 
mission, an individual learned to trust his training and education. While fear remained present, 
individuals performed when others might have hesitated or panicked. New, uncertain situations 
did not create the same trepidation or intimidation as they might have done previously. The 
individual’s comfort zone increased. In regard to these men, this expanded comfort zone later 
enabled them to migrate to new communities with new people, integrate into the fabric of society, 
and establish relationships. Since the new neighborhoods would not have the same hardened 
social structures as established communities on the eastern seaboard, the junior leader’s 
opportunity to put his training to use worked to allow him to gain positions of trust based on skill 
and merit. Confidence in new abilities did not come solely from reading a manual or instruction.31 
Developing junior leaders required the combination of experience and training.
First Exposure to Combat
When tracking leader development in the written records, it is particularly important to 
note how the soldiers recorded their reactions to their first exposure to combat and how they 
matured over the period of their service. Chronology was important because all the men 
experienced combat before they received any training on leadership. In most cases, formal 
training occurred two years after they joined. After they underwent instruction, their memoirs 
show an appreciation and application of their lessons.
With only two exceptions, the diaries and letters used underwent some editing before 
dissemination to family members or publication.32 The incidents recalled and remaining in the 
accounts were im portant to the individual. Even events that at first glance might seem 
embarrassing to the casual reader serve as starting point for finding the author's growth as a 
soldier. The junior leaders knew they had changed over time and wrote about these incidents. The 
soldiers saw them as formative events in their lives and service. The study will analyze these 
initial exposures to combat and the lessons that the author either learned or wanted to pass on to 
his family and friends once the work was published.
31 Cox, A Proper Sense o f  Honor, 44. “Reading about army life was not going to train the army. 
Rather, living the Army life would have to do it.”
32 Jerem iah Greenman and Benjamin Gilbert’s letters have survived unedited.
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Understandably, an individual's first experience in combat varied. Common reactions 
involved terror and fear.33 Thankfulness for survival and attributing their safety to divine 
protection were other common r e a c t io n s .3 4  Tracking reactions and recording of the individuals' 
first exposure to combat for leader development makes it possible to plot their growth over 
subsequent campaigns and years. The crucial aspect is to understand how each individual 
remembered and viewed his own initial combat experience, and not how another may have 
viewed his composure. Another party may have viewed an him as uncaring, disinterested, or calm 
under pressure, when in fact, the individual may have been terrified, but maintained the 
necessary composure because of training and experience and to inspire courage in his 
subordinates. Leading individuals during stressful times required the ability to instill confidence. 
How an individual learned this lesson can be understood by examining the record of his first 
exposure to combat and how good leaders acted in subsequent entries.
Martin's diary contained one of the more fully developed and chronological accounts of 
the growth and development of an individual's leadership skills and experience. Martin 
acknowledged the start of his growth as. a leader during the New York campaign when he recorded 
his first recognition as a "man" by an officer. Martin's unit landed at Brooklyn and was marching 
towards the battle when he encountered wounded men for the first time and started to feel fear. 
Another soldier then started complaining about being thirsty to an officer when Martin recounted 
what the officer said. "‘Look at that m an,’ said he, pointing to me, ‘he is not thirsty, I will warrant 
it.’ I felt a little elated to be styled a m a n ."35 Being recognized as a man by someone in authority 
during a time of danger made an impression on Martin. Martin recorded this entry as his marker
33 Ebenezer Fletcher, The Narrative o f  Ebenezer Fletcher, a Soldier o f  the Revolution, ed. Charles
I. Bushnell (New York,: Priv. print., 1866), 14. " The enemy pursued our men in great haste. Some 
of them came over the log where I lay. Some came so near I could almost touch them. I was not 
discovered by the enemy till the battle was over. When they were picking up the dead and 
wounded among the brush and logs, I heard them  coming towards me, and began to be much 
terrified, lest I should be found."
34 Samuel A. Green, Three M ilitary Diaries Kept by Groton Soldiers in Different Wars; (Groton, 
Mass.: J. Wilson and Son, 1901), 84. "Monday tus wedens May 8. 9 & 10 days Etended Prayers 
Morning And night there was Several gons Discharged about this time Kiled one or two others 
Escaping narraly Blesed Be God that my life is Preserved" All quotations are rendered as recorded 
for the remainder of the paper.
35 Joseph Plumb Martin, A  Narrative o f  Some o f  the Adventures, Dangers and Sufferings o f  a 
Revolutionary Soldier; Interspersed with Anecdotes o f  Incidents That Occurred within His Own 
Observation (Hallowell Me.: Printed by Glazier Masters & Co., 1830), 19.
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as to when he stopped being a boy and m atured into an adult.
Later in the battle, Martin saw his first example of poor leadership, and it remained with
him for 50 years. A lieutenant ran around his soldiers in fear, sniveling, blubbering, and asking
for forgiveness from his men for any wrong doings he may have committed. Martin was disgusted
with the performance. As he noted: "A fine soldier you are, I thought, an exemplary man for
young soldiers! I would have then suffered anything short of death than have made such an
exhibition of myself...."36 Martin internalized this lesson about the proper composure for a leader.
Martin did not fault the officer for being afraid. He was critical in the way he showed it and the
effect it had on his soldiers. Martin himself recorded that even though he had to retreat very
quickly when in danger of being overrun by superior forces, he maintained his composure.
Some of our men at this time seemed to think that they could never run fast or far 
enough. I never wanted to run, if I was forced to run, further than to be beyond the reach 
of the enemy's shot, after which I had no more fear of their overtaking me than I should 
have of an army of lobsters doing, unless it were their horsemen, and they dared not do 
it. [italics in o r ig in a l]3 7
Similar to Martin, Jerem iah Greenman initially enlisted at a young age as a private early 
in the war. His first major campaign was the disastrous assault on Quebec. Greenman breached 
the walls of Quebec, but he was trapped inside when the remainder of the Continental Army fled 
after the death of General Montgomery. His first exposure to combat introduced him to heroism 
and cowardice. Greenman did not run and the British took him prisoner and he spent the next ten 
months in captivity.38
Ten months of captivity m atured Greenman far beyond his eighteen years. He saw 
numerous men die from sickness, felt despondent, tried to escape, learned how to keep men's 
hope alive, and learned what to expect from l e a d e r s .39 After a prisoner exchange, Greenman 
became a First Sergeant within two years. Greenman's promotions suggested ability; past
36 Ibid., 20.
37 Ibid., 54.
38 Greenman, Diary, 23,32.
39 Ibid., 26,27 & 29 - "the officer come in went down Seller asked what we was a cutting the ice
from that door for /  we told him we did not know /  Neither did we know who it was but thay
m istrust'd that we was agoing to try to git out but that did not know "(p.26); "May 1776 S26 to 
F31. Continue in prison /  hear we live very discontented and quite out of hope of ever being reliv’d 
but keep up our hearts all we can" (p. 27); "June M17 to S30...we are put off from one day to 
another and next week but we keep our hearts up all we can for our cituasion for we are very 
unhealthey by keeping us in such a hole not fit for dogs much more for men." (p. 29).
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performance resulted in his promotion to Sergeant for his next enlistment and led to his 
appointment as First Sergeant/W ithout evidence of other factors such as patronage, wealth, or 
social status, the officers in Greenman's unit noticed both the effect he had on the soldiers and his 
past performance, and promoted him into positions of greater responsibility^0
Greenman's maturity and transformation can be tracked by the content of his entries 
between September 1775 and March of 1776. Greenman's diaiy begins by noting the day-to-day 
activities of a soldier.41 These types of entries continued for seven months until the third month of 
captivity. Beginning in March 1776, his entries started to comment on items such as policies, 
events of greater significance than his immediate surroundings, and behavior of the leaders. 
Greenman clearly began to think about and see the military situation in a larger context than just 
its immediate effects on him.42 He learned what good leaders need to do to take care of men in 
stressful situations. This knowledge would have been invaluable while serving as justice of the 
peace in Ohio in 1806.
During his first exposure to combat as a young officer, Ebenezer Denny experienced 
combat unlike anything he saw during his naval exploits. He noted that the initial sight of battle 
sickened h im .4 3  His first time in combat as an officer almost ended in disaster when he came close 
to passing out from dehydration. Lieutenant Denny survived his first encounter in a skirmish near 
Williamsburg and took part in the final assault on Yorktown’s d e fe n se s .4 4
4° Ibid., 104. The editors, Robert Bray and Paul Bushnell, opine that Greenman owed “his advance 
through the ranks as much as steadfastness as to anything else.” They base this assessment on his 
being relied upon to take his unit to retrieve the majority of the Rhode Island regiment which 
mutinied in 1779: “informed me that the biger part of the Regement had tu rn’d out in Muterny /  I 
received orders to march with my men to camp all except 3 which was {to} keep Guad. /  I then 
pushed on for camp as fast as possible ware I arrived about 4 oclock ware I joined my party to 
sum more Capt. Humphry had. /  then m archt in persuit of the Mutiners which had marcht off for 
Greenwich to take a man from the Guad that was under Sentince of Death for M uterny”
41 Ibid., 15, 22, and 25. S7. Set out this morn very early /  came 7 milds (p.15); S9. a pleasant morn 
but Cule /  in the after noon there was orders given for 440 men to be in readiness (p. 22); F 16 to 
T 29 very Cold indeed /  we git sum wheat that is [in] bags below ware we go after wood and burn 
it wich makith very good Coffe and selling sum of our thing we git sum money & so we have once 
in a wile sums Caffe (p. 25).
42 Ibid., 26,27,29 and 30.
43 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f  M ajor Ebenezer Denny, 7:240. "Here for the first time saw 
wounded men; Feelings not very agreeable; endeavor to conquer this disposition or weakness; the 
site sickened me."
44 Ibid., 7:241. “My captain, Montgomery, received a shot in his foot and had hopped back in the 
rear; Lieutenant Bluer being absent, the charge of the company devolved on me; young and 
inexperienced, exhausted with hunger and fatigue, had like to have disgraced m yself-had eat
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The content of the entries in his diary illustrate Denny's transformation from a terrified 
young man in his first skirmish to a seasoned officer. Denny's real maturity and leadership growth 
took place when his unit marched to South Carolina, where he spent the next fourteen months 
outside of Charleston. He impressed the right individuals through his competence. He even made 
note of dining with General Nathaniel Green. Denny took command of separate units for foraging 
missions and witnessed the reduction of his Pennsylvania regiment through i l ln e s s .45 Denny 
exercised good leadership skills while serving in a climate inhospitable for Pennsylvania soldiers 
who lacked adequate supplies. Denny's account made note of his concern for the care and feeding 
of his men:
Our camp very thin; not more than three relieves of officers and men for the ordinary 
duties. Hospitals crowded, and great many sick in camp; deaths so frequent, the funeral 
ceremony dispensed with. Provisions scarce and very indifferent; the beef brought from 
the back counties of North Carolina, by the time they reach the camp, poor indeed, and 
must be unwholesome A6
This entry correlated closely with the lessons von Steuben wrote in his manual on the officer’s
responsibility to care for his men in all matters.47
Like Martin, Samuel Richards was also present at the battle of Long Island and
experienced the fear and confusion of the battlefield similar to Martin's recollections. Richards
was a subaltern during the Battle of Long Island.48 He noted the confusion of the battle and the
disregard for the accepted conduct of the laws of war by the British regulars in bayoneting the
wounded: "..., yet the scenes of this memorable day was so complicated that enough remains to be
told occupy an inquisitive mind. No mention being made of the wounded, it is presumed that they
were dispatched by the bayonet. No one unused to such scenes can form any just idea of the
confused and mixed scenes of that day. "49 Richards let his family know that unless one
experienced combat, it was extremely difficult to convey in words the chaos, complexity, and
horror. The experience had a lasting effect on him and his development as a leader.
nothing all day but a few blackberries-was faint, and with difficulty kept my place; once or twice 
was about to throw away my arms (a very heavy espontoon).”
45 Ibid., 7:253. "Pennsylvanians have been reduced, by deaths, desertions, &c., and were now 
incorporated into one regiment of six hundred men."
46 Ibid., 7:251.
47 United States. Continental Army, Regulations, 139.
48 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 209.
49 Ibid., 218.
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His memoir recounted his development as a soldier and officer accustomed to the rigors 
of combat. With a certain sangfroid he notes, "One night a ball passed thro' my apartm ent in the 
barrack, a few feet over me as I lay in my berth. Such things having become common, we thought 
little of them."5° Richards’ growing m aturity as a leader led him to recognize that there are some 
things one can control in war and some things one cannot. He let the reader know there is no use 
worrying over them.
Richards’ diary contained an account for his family to demonstrate he was brave in battle,
but not foolish. His account mentions the feelings of patriotism and desire to be tested in battle
during the siege of Boston in 1775. After participating in numerous campaigns, he displayed the
wisdom and maturity of a leader. This is his account of his conduct during one engagement:
The soldier well knows that when the smoke from the muzzle of the vent of the gun is 
seen in the same line with himself the piece points directly at him. I recollect that, seeing 
the flash of the discharge of a gun, the smoke from the muzzle and vent being in line with 
me, I stepped behind a tree while the grape passed, one of which I noticed struck the tree. 
Those being the only passes through which the enemy could approach directly, and our 
force so posted was viewed sufficient to defend them, both bodies remained in that 
position until the night of the 26th.51
Richards moved and hid behind a tree when the enemy fired. A less seasoned leader might have
been afraid of showing cowardice in front of his men. Richards was sure enough of his conduct,
growth, and performance as a leader to record this episode for his family. Creating and remaining
in formation was an important part of eighteenth-century tactics. For a leader to break formation
could be a serious issue. This is why Richards immediately followed his account of the episode
with a sentence to ensure his family knew he did not run and was not a coward. He remained with
his unit in position and performed his duty. Richards’ diary contained episodes highlighting the
author’s satisfaction at having performed as befitted an officer after less than a year as an enlisted
man. Richards quickly made the transition to the officer ranks and his own recollections record
satisfactory service without presenting himself as a hero.
As mentioned earlier, Benjamin Gilbert enlisted as a private and made sergeant during
his first four years in the Army. Gilbert did not record his first impressions of combat while an
enlisted soldier. This could have been due to the absence of major battles in his unit’s area of
5° Ibid., 209. 
s1 Ibid., 217.
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operation. Later as a newly commissioned officer in 1780, two letters written almost ten months 
apart displayed Gilbert’s growth as a leader. The first letter, written to his family after being back 
in the army only six weeks as a commissioned officer, recorded his frustration with his duties. As 
a commissioned officer, his leadership responsibilities should have increased. Instead, he found 
his duties remarkably similar to the ones he left behind as a sergeant. He contemplated resigning 
and leaving the army:
As soon as I am sertain that the remaining Regiments will not be filled with men for the 
War I shall leave the Army immediately, for I am determined not to be a drill Sergeant 
allways. Ever since I came to camp I have ben up at day-brake disciplining the levies and 
every afternoon when off duty on the same or Business. As soon as they are learned their 
times are out we must take new ones that makes us perpettual slaves.s2
Another letter written ten months later extolled the army’s success and lauded the
soldiers’ bravery: "Our army being at that time from Eight to fifteen miles from the field of action,
no immediate support could be lent them, but they maintaining their groung with unexampled
Braverey, kept the Enemy at such a distance, as gave time for six hundred of Pensilvania line to
come to their a s s is t a n c e .  "53 This is the same series of skirmishes around Williamsburg in which
Denny first tasted combat. Lieutenant Gilbert evidently learned how to motivate and direct his
troops in combat, which is a fundamental part of leadership well demonstrated by the soldiers'
performance. Gilbert went from a petulant junior officer complaining about his soldiers to a
mature leader extolling their bravery to his family.
Forging Leaders
While important, combat experience alone is insufficient to forge a junior leader into one 
who can transfer hard-earned skills to civilian pursuits. Even though some individuals are born 
leaders, the vast majority requires instruction to be successful. The United States did not possess 
a noble class that provided leaders for the newly formed Continental Army. Although initially 
enamored with the idea of citizen-soldiers formed into militia units, General Washington and 
congressional leaders eventually understood independence required a professional army to 
prosecute the war. The British Army used the sons of nobility to populate its junior officer corps
s2 Gilbert, Winding Down, 25.
53 Ibid., 46.
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and developed sergeants through a process of on-the-job training for ten y e a r s .54 The Continental 
Army could not exercise either of these options. It did not have a pool of noble sons nor the time 
to grow sergeants. A large pool of former professional soldiers also did not exist from which to 
draw. The army would have to teach junior officers quickly through a combination of training, 
education, and experience.
Continental Army leaders with previous British Army service knew the shortfalls of the 
Continental Army. Short terms of service as provincial soldiers during the Seven Years War 
provided only a rudimentary foundation on which to produce an army’s l e a d e r s .55 The challenge 
was educating junior leaders fast enough in the face of expiring enlistments, combat losses, and 
extended maneuvers. Pamphlets and manuals existed for maneuver tactics, siege warfare, or 
logistics, but leadership development was noticeably absents6 The sons of nobles were expected 
to have learned the art of command from father figures and other male nobles. Military manuals 
treated the art of command as a requirement before attempting to master the science of war. 
Merely studying war in a book proved insufficient to bridge the distance between novice and 
practitioner. The Continental Army commanders did not bridge the gap until two and half years
54 Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A  Social History o f  M ilitary Life in the 
Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 23, 97. The average age of the 
British soldier in the Army when he joined was twenty. The average infantryman had ten years of 
service. He was part of a group of men who had lived, trained, and campaigned together for years, 
which in turn created an extremely strong bond of kinship. The men’s immediate leaders, the 
noncommissioned officers, were predominantly promoted from within the ranks after many years 
of service. Although commissioned officers were responsible for the training of their men, the 
class-conscious officers found it demeaning and boring, and NCOs conducted the real training.
55 Virginia Steele, “George Washington’s Military Manuals” (Library of Congress, 2010); John 
Womack Wright, Some Notes on the Continental Arm y. (Cornwallville, N. Y.,: Hope Farm Press], 
1963). The most comprehensive list of Washington's Military Manuals is contained in a document 
prepared by the Library of Congress. Wright's Some Notes on the Continental A rm y  is another 
good source. Numerous leaders tried to bridge the gaps in their knowledge by obtaining books on 
military science.
s6 Thomas Simes, The M ilitary Guide fo r  Young Officers, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: J. Humphrey, R. 
Bell, and R. Aitken, 1776); Thomas Webb, A  M ilitary Treatise on the Appointments o f  the A rm y  
Containing M any Useful Hints, N o t Touched upon before by A ny Author: And Proposing Some 
New Regulations in the Arm y, Which Will Be Particularly Useful in Carrying on the War in 
North-America: Together with A  Short Treatise on M ilitary Honors (Philadelphia: Printed by W. 
Dunlap, 1759); William Young, The Practice o f  Manoeuvring a Battalion o f  Infantry. By William 
Young, Late M ajor o f  Brigade to the Corps o f  Grenadiers and Highlanders Who Served in 
Germany, and N ow  in the Service o f  Brunswick. (London: Printed for J. Millan near Whitehall, 
1771). The technical aspect of some of the manuals was very informative and practical such as 
Young's Maneuvers which contained detailed explanations and the use of terrain boards and map 
exercises that would be familiar to current soldiers. Others such as Simes' The M ilitary Guide fo r  
Young Officers or Webb's A  Treatise on the Appointm ents o f  the A rm y  contained more theory 
and maxims supported by examples from antiquity and more recent European campaigns.
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later during the winter encampment from 1777-1778 at Valley Forge when Baron von Steuben 
wrote, disseminated, and personally taught his manual to junior leaders.
It would be hard to over-estimate the importance of von Steuben’s manual on the 
professionalization of the Continental Army. Most regard it as a drill manual that allowed the 
American soldiers to compete with the British soldiers on the battlefield using similar tactics. In 
fact, it did accomplish this task as demonstrated at the subsequent Battle of Monmouth in June 
1778. More importantly, the manual provided instructions to junior leaders on their 
responsibilities and duties.57 In addition to required qualifications, the manual identified the 
traits and habits of junior leaders at every level, s8 Promotion was not based on social status, 
popularity, or seniority but on ability and demonstrated proficiency. The junior leader ranks 
became a meritocracy and broke with provincial or militia traditions.
Learning the manual was the educational portion of junior leader development. The 
repetition of drill and manual of arms constituted the training portion of the leader’s growth. The 
junior leaders mastered a task and then had to teach new recruits from all areas of the country
57 United States. Continental Army, Regulations. Baron von Steuben's manual was not entirely 
new creation. Several passages were condensed versions of previous published works.
Instructions for Captains and Lieutenants can be found in Simes, Thomas. The M ilitary Guide fo r  
Young Officers. However, duties for noncommissioned officers are missing.
58 Ibid. United States. Continental Army, Regulations. "A captain cannot be too careful of the 
company the state has committed to his charge. He must pay the greatest attention to the health 
of his men, their discipline, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, clothes and necessaries. His first 
object should be, to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and 
humanity, enquiring into their complaints, and well founded, seeing them  redressed. He should 
know every man of his company by name and character (p. 138)”. For Lieutenant, "He should 
endeavor to gain the love of his men, by attention to everything which may contribute to their 
health and convenience. He should often visit them at different hours; inspect into their manner 
of living; see that their provisions are good and well cooked, and as far as possible oblige them to 
take their meals at regulated hours. He should pay attention to their complaints, and when well 
founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but discourage them from complaining on every 
frivolous occasion (p. 141)." First Sergeant, "The soldier having acquired that degree of confidence 
of his officers as to be appointed first sergeant of the company, Should consider the importance of 
his office; that the discipline of the company, the conduct of the men, their exactness and obeying 
orders, and the regularity of their manners, will integrate measure depend on his vigilance. He 
should be intimately acquainted with the character of every soldier of the company, and should 
take great pains to impress upon their minds the indispensable necessity of the strictest 
obedience, as the foundation of order and regularity (p. 145).” Sergeants and corporals. " It being 
on the noncommissioned officers that the discipline and order of a company and a great measure 
depends, they cannot be too circumspect in their behavior towards the men, by treating them with 
mildness, and at the same time obliging everyone to do his duty. By avoiding two great familiarity 
with the men, they will not only gain their love and confidence, but they traded with a proper 
respect; whereas by a contrary conduct they forfeit all regard, in their authority becomes despised
(p. 148).”
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and differing educational levels. Much like a craftsman teaching an apprentice, junior leaders had 
to instill discipline and a response to commands to ensure survival on and off the battlefield. The 
junior leaders learned how to use fear, instill respect, disperse praise and administer justice to 
train and lead their charges. Especially for sergeants, intimidation could only be a short-term  
leadership tactic. Day-to-day interaction required more than just barking orders. Several different 
approaches were needed to deal with different situations. Not all sergeants succeeded, but the 
ones who learned adaptability flourished. Familiarity with human nature in stressful situations 
would have given these junior leaders an advantage, especially for those individuals who executed 
the duties of justice of the peace or sheriff, in dealing with civilians in new c o m m u n i t i e s .59 The 
memoirs written during and after the war by the chosen individuals demonstrated the importance 
of von Steuben’s lessons and their effect on their future lives.
Martin was still a private at Valley Forge and was part of the initial training base for the 
newly trained forces. As Martin recorded, "After I joined my regiment I was kept constantly, when 
off other duty, engaged in learning the Baron de Steuben's new Prussian exercise; it was a 
continual drill."60 Martin learned his lessons well and made sergeant a couple of years later.61 
Martin achieved fame with historians due to his ability to tell a good story about his experiences, 
but the highest rank he achieved was sergeant late in the war due to his young age. Martin was 
only twenty when appointed a sergeant in the Corps of Miners and the war essentially ended 
within the year.
Although Greenman was only a few years older than Martin when he enlisted, he was also 
very perceptive observer of human nature. These two facts allowed him to achieve rank faster 
than Martin. When Greenman received instruction personally from Baron von Steuben on drill
59 Ibid., 142. Junior leaders mastered listening to the soldiers and deciding how to handle 
problems. Elected officials required the same talents when dealing with constituents. This 
instruction is directed at lieutenants: “He should pay attention to their complaints, and when 
well-founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but discourage them  from complaining on every 
frivolous occasion.”
60 Martin, A Narrative, 86.
61 Ibid., 140. "All the officers were required to be acquainted with the sciences, and it was 
desirable to have as intelligent young men as could be procured to compose it, although some of 
us fell considerably short of perfection. Agreeable to the arrangement between my former 
commander and my new captain, I was appointed a sergeant in this corps, which was as high an 
office I ever obtained in the army; and I had some doubts in my own mind at the time whether I 
was altogether qualified for that."
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and command later in his enlistment, he recognized the importance of what von Steuben wrote.62 
While historians know that Continental Army officers attempted to make up for deficiencies in 
military science through their book purchases, Greenman’s diary contained entries on the actual 
reading of military manuals to increase his professional knowledge.^ Entries in this part of the 
diary contain more fully formed thoughts, as well as observations on more consequential m atters 
than the weather and hunger. It is clear Greenman improved his literacy skills as he progressed 
through the ranks. His entries also highlight his growth and maturity as a commander of men.
Denny does not specifically mention any formal education as a soldier, while Gilbert’s 
letters and diaiy contain information on his education and training of soldiers. Denny received 
his commission rather late in the war in August 1780 just in time for Yorktown.64 He briefly 
mentions that he received some on-the-job instruction from his company commander as he 
deployed his soldiers for battle. “My captain (Montgomery) fell behind his company where my 
place was, talked with me; gives me a lesson useful to me.”6s This is Denny’s sole mention of any 
training or instruction in his memoirs. While Denny did not receive instruction from von Steuben, 
he knew of his impact on the Army.66 He evidently was familiar with von Steuben’s manual since 
his preferred duty was as an adjutant, and his observations conformed to the duties and 
responsibilities of a junior leader.6?
Richards’ unit wintered in the Highlands and West Point between 1777-1778 and partook 
in von Steuben’s training later in the year.68 Richards commanded a select unit of 200 soldiers to 
receive training from one of von Steuben’s disciples.69 Richards may have received some on-the-
62 Greenman, Diary, 134,139. “April 1779, S4 to T22 ...we exercise the prusan way left of the 
64th. intirely..” and “September 1779 S5 ...order’d to see our mens arm cleen to march in the 
morn to be reviewed by Barron Stuban, a Major Genl. Who hold the rank of inspector Genl. Of the 
American army /  he is prusan /  first brought the prusan Exercise into our army”
63 Ibid., 210. “(June 1781) “F8 Continuing at my quarters /  the forepart of the day in reading 
Military Instruction for officers... S9 Spent the forenoon in reading Military Instruction”
64 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f  M ajor Ebenezer Denny, 7:237.
65 Ibid., 7:240.
66 Ibid., 7:243. “Baron Steuben, our great military oracle.”
6? Ibid., 7:255. 255 “Exercised often; perform the parade duties in absence of the adjutant -  very 
fond of this.” The manual explained in great detail the responsibilities of the adjutant for drill and 
ceremonies.
68 Samuel Richards, “Personal Narrative of an Officer in the Revolutionary War Part II,” United 
Service; a Quarterly Review o f  M ilitary and Naval Affairs (1879-1905), September 1884, 277.
69 Ibid., 279. “Baron Steuben having arrived in the country to introduce into our army the 
Prussian discipline, a French officer was sent from him on to the Point, and two hundred men
2 4
job training from one other well-known individual. He shared quarters with Thaddeus Kosciusko 
and accompanied him on surveys J° The only clues to his knowledge of the requirements for his 
position are the numerous entries that could serve as examples for von Steuben’s traits.?1 The 
entries are often inserted with little regard for the flow of the narrative. Even though they were 
not germane to the story he was telling, they were important enough that he wanted his son to 
know how he acted in accordance with the expectations of a commissioned officer and did not 
abuse his position. When he wrote, he also wanted to challenge the prevailing feeling that 
commissioned officers were trying to create a new aristocracy by their demands for pensions in 
the aftermath of the war. Richards was a charter member of the Society of Cincinnati and worked 
faithfully to obtain pensions for soldiers in later years.?2
Like Richards, Benjamin Gilbert’s regiment spent the winter of 1777-1778 quartered along 
the Hudson River in New York, and therefore did not partake of von Steuben’s drill exercises at 
Valley Forge.?3 His regiment does not seem to have acquired the new manuals until late spring 
1778.74 Gilbert was quite a bit older than Martin and Greenman, but much more immature at the 
time. At the age of twenty four, his diary contains numerous entries such as, “Got back to camp 
Just before sunrise and meeting again at 8 ocClock we kept up a Drinking all Day.”?s Most 
mentions of other sergeants contain references to drinking grog with them. His first term of 
service expired January 17,1780.76 While Gilbert left the Army as a sergeant, his diary contains 
numerous references to fraternizing with officers to include his company commander, Captain
were selected to pass through the exercises as a model, of which I had the command, and two days 
in the week we used to go through the exercises, with maneuvering and firing.”
?° Ibid., 278.
71 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 210. “Readers of History generally seem to be looking for 
descriptions of bloody battles and counting the number of killed and wounded, but the real 
philanthrophist must experience a higher gratification in contemplating a series of firm, prudent, 
and judicious arrangements tending to effect a great object without one of those sanguinary 
conflicts which so strongly interest the feelings of most readers.” The previous entry exemplifies 
the importance von Steuben placed on accomplishing the routine duties on page 142 of his 
manual. Richards entry on helping a wounded comrade served as an example for von Steuben’s 
admonition to care for the wounded on page 139: “The attachment that arises from this kind of 
attention to the sick and the wounded, is almost inconceivable; it will moreover be the means of 
preserving the lives of many valuable men.”
?2 Samuel Richards, “Samuel Richards Papers” (Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, 
Connecticut, 1828 1818), MS 101392.
?3 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 46.




Daniel Shays.77 While his diary entries do not leave the reader with the impression of diligence, he 
evidently impressed his officers, which is why he was able to obtain a commission as an officer 
later in the year on February 21,1780.78 Gilbert’s sole reference to self-improvement came when 
he noted borrowing a book on geography from a fellow o f f ic e r .79 Map reading and terrain 
appreciation were indispensable skills for a commissioned officer. Gilbert evidently recognized his 
deficiency and undertook to correct it.
Demonstrating abilities to manage people, administer justice, form bonds, and 
understand the larger reality of the United States made veteran junior leaders attractive 
candidates for local elected office and public trust. The men in this study recorded events . 
confirming their proficiency at these tasks. Even if they understood the importance of these skills 
before joining the army, continued service in the army made them extremely competent. 
Continued service in the Continental Army is the important variable, which sets these men apart 
from their comrades in the militia. The Continental Army soldiers gained wisdom during the long 
periods in the field, before and after the battle, when the militias and short-term enlistees were 
absent. Citizen-soldiers in the militia generally fought for much shorter periods, near home, and 
with neighbors and kinfolk. Although combat in any form affects an individual, substantive 
leadership changes take place over longer periods than possible in a battle or maneuvers. The 
Continental Army soldiers experienced long-term exposure to discipline, deprivation, and 
poverty, sustained in a unique environment where the transformation occurred.80 The diaries of 
our soldiers provide ample evidence of this hard-earned and practiced wisdom.
Successful leaders learn how to lead people and manage resources, and Continental Army 
soldiers were no exception. Soldiers recognized good and bad leadership and noted it in their 
diaries and letters.81 Martin was an especially prolific writer on good and bad leadership examples
77 This is the same Shays of Shays Rebellion in 1786.
78 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 65.
79 Ibid., 66.
80 Martin and  Lender, A  Respectable Arm y, 69-77; Bolton, The Private Soldier Under 
Washington, 70.
81 Samuel Bixby, Sergeant Samuel Bixby Diary (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 
n.d.), 295. "Col. David Brewer was tried by a Court Martial, for giving his son, 16 years of age, a 
commission, and drawing the pay for him for the month of August, while the inexperienced lad 
was at home in his own service. Also, for sending two soldiers belonging to his Regiment to work 
on his farm! The Court ordered the said David Brewer to be dismissed the service. Amen to that.”
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he observed. W hether the steadfast commander in combat, the selfish lieutenants who looked 
after their own needs before their own soldiers’, the drunken officers along the line of march, or in 
any other episodes, Martin was sure to portray them in terms the average citizen could 
understand.82 He also included an assessment of his own conduct to show he had learned how a 
good leader acted . 83 One of the more profound examples Martin recorded toward the end of his 
first enlistment involved an aide de camp who made a rash judgment without gathering all the 
facts. Martin knew what the appropriate actions should have been, and he implied the aide de 
camp should have known as well. Martin recorded for his readers the importance he placed on 
protecting his fellow soldiers, and by extension, his neighbors when he was in public service.
A sergeant was accused by an aide-de-camp of deserting his post when he was in fact 
carrying out the orders of his superior officer to procure additional ammunition in the midst of 
the battle .84 The aide-de-camp drew his sword and ordered the sergeant back to his unit. The 
sergeant then cocked and pointed his musket at the officer and told him he was going to follow his 
officer's orders. The sergeant was subdued and sentenced for execution. When he was brought 
before the troops for execution, a last minute stay was issued. The planned execution had not 
been well received by the Connecticut troops. As Martin recorded, "But the Sergeant was 
reprieved, and I believe it was well that he was, for his blood would have not been the only blood
82 Martin, A  Narrative, 92,107.. "The officer who commanded the platoon that I belonged to was 
a captain, belonging to the Rhode Island troops, and a fine brave man he was; he feared nobody 
nor nothing. When we were paraded, ‘Now,’ he said to us, ‘you have been wishing for some days 
past to come up with the British, you have been wanting to fight. Now you shall have fighting 
enough before the night.’ The men did not need much haranguing to raise their courage, for when 
the officers came to order the sick and lame to stay behind as guards, they were forced to exercise 
their authority to the full extent before they could make even the invalid stay behind, and when 
some of their arms were about to be exchanged with those who were going into the field, they 
would not part with them. ‘If their arms went,’ they said, ‘they would go with them at all events (p. 
92).’” "Some of the other officers who had not dipped their bills quite so deep parted them, at the 
same time representing to them the ridiculous situation they stood in, fighting like blackguards in 
sight of the soldiers (p. 107)."
83 Ibid., 142. "However, I was a Sergeant, and I think I did use my best abilities to perform the 
duties of the office according to my best knowledge and judgment. Indeed, I can say at this late 
hour of my life, that my conscious never did, and I trust never will, accuse me of any failure in my 
duty to my country, but, on the contrary, I always fulfilled my engagements to her, however she 
failed in for fulfilling hers with me." Through another diary entry in 1781, Martin provided an 
excellent manifestation of learning the lessons of leadership and having been transformed by 
service. Martin, now a Sergeant in the Corps of Miners, was on furlough for an extended period in 
West Point, New York. When he returned to camp, he found out that his unit and soldiers had 
been ordered south to participate in the siege of Yorktown. Although given permission to remain 
behind, Martin felt a sense of obligation to his men as a noncommissioned officer.
84 Ibid., 34.
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that would have been spilt...[But], as I said before, it was well that it ended as it did, both on 
account of the honor of the soldiers and the safety of some others.... "8s This was an extreme 
example of how bad leadership almost precipitated mutinous conduct. While rash acts are easily 
identified, neglect can be just as insidious.
Greenman identified poor officer leadership during his first captivity. Greenman also 
learned how soldiers perceived leaders' and officers' behaviors. As he and his fellow soldiers were 
enduring deplorable conditions in captivity, he made the following entry: "we hear that our 
officer have thair Liberty of ye town &cfort."86 Greenman made note when the British officers and 
officials visited the captive Continental Army soldiers, and even recorded the gist of the 
conversations. Very few visits by Continental Army officers are recorded in his diary during his 
captivity. This entry of the officers’ visit was Greenman's way of voicing frustration at the seeming 
lack of concern of the American officers for the well-being of the enlisted soldiers. As Greenman 
was bonding with his fellow captives, he internalized the idea that loyalty works both ways in the 
chain of command, as his diary entry suggested. Leaders expect soldiers to be loyal to them, but 
soldiers also expect leaders to be loyal in return.8? This is what Baron von Steuben's instructions 
to Lieutenants meant to convey. This type of loyalty would have been important in a civilian post 
of trust as well.
While Gilbert may not have been an exemplary sergeant off duty, he knew what was 
expected of leaders on the march. While his unit maneuvered for battle, noncommissioned and 
commissioned officers were reduced for failing to obey orders against pillaging the local 
population. “Seijt. Peck of Capt Bensons Compy got Reduced to Ranks for Going into an oarchard 
after apples. Adjt Trotter and Lieut Cooper had their Swords Taken from them for Gettin into a 
Turnip yard after Turnips.”88 Bad leadership decisions resulted in the administration of military 
justice. Given the practices of eighteenth-century warfare, reductions in rank and lashes were not 
uncommon.
8s Ibid., 35.
86 Greenman, D iary , 30.
8? Ibid., 214.. In 1781, when 1st Lieutenant Greenman was captive again, he did not forget his men 
even though he was given more freedom as an officer. “T21. This day went to Graves End Neck /  
picked a few cucumber, from a friends field and sent to the prisoners in the Sugar house [cipher]”
88 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 37.
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Junior leaders constantly administered or witnessed military justice. Diaries are replete 
with punishments meted out to soldiers of all ranks. Some authors have misread the prevalence of 
punishments dealt out by courts-martial as evidence of the arbitrariness of officers in abusing the 
enlisted force, when in fact, junior leaders understood the need for a formal system of justice to 
prevent even worse forms of soldier (in justice and anarchy .89 Martin witnessed many acts of 
military justice, but never noted his own application of any punishment.
Greenman, Denny, Richards, and Gilbert all recorded their participation in the military 
justice system. Their entries indicated necessity, but no great love, for the duty. After Greenman’s 
promotion to commissioned officer, his diaiy became filled with notes referencing duty on courts- 
martial panels. Up until the end of the war, he administered military justice on a regular basis, 
but not all charges resulted in punishment for the accused soldiers.^0 Denny’s notes on military 
justice are very sparse with his only extended comments being on the insurrection by disaffected 
soldiers and officers in Philadelphia after the war.91 Richards recounted having the unpleasant 
duty of executing a traitor who had orders to enlist disaffected Continental Army soldiers in the 
loyalist cause:
The order being positive, I could do no other than execute it, however unpleasant and 
mournful. I forwarded a seijeant with a small party to the place of execution to make the 
necessary preparation, and on the 9th of June superintended his execution in presence of 
a large concourse of spectators, among which were his own family. After hanging the 
hour, the body was taken down, and a request was made from his family that the body
89 Neimeyer, America Goes to War, 131,136, and 140." The kinds and degrees of resistance 
practiced by the soldiers were connected to the kinds and degrees of repression and violence they 
suffered at the hands of their officers (p. 136)." Some historians have questioned the discipline 
aspect of leadership in the Continental Army by noting the mutinies that occurred at various 
periods during the war, numerous courts martial, and the high rates of desertion. Although any 
army hoped to avoid mutinies, crimes punishable by courts martial, and the unauthorized 
absence of soldiers, a reexamination of the unique circumstances of the Continental Army 
revealed the impact of junior leader development on these issues. W hat Neimeyer failed to 
understand about the Continental Army mutinies was that they were extraordinarily disciplined 
affairs. The soldiers did not turn into pillaging mobs, desert in mass, or go over to the British.
9° Greenman, Diary, 248. "This day set on Court Martial /  Tryed Sergt. Crandal for disobedience 
of Orders & a Soldier for forging Major olneys Name /  both acquited"
91 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f  M ajor Ebenezer Denny, 7:257. “A few days brought General Howe 
from headquarters with a brigade of light troops, for purpose of suppressing the insurrection. 
Most of the officers who were here previous to our arrival were arrested, and a few taken in close 
custody. General court martial ordered for their trial. Government were desirous of getting rid of 
the army in as quiet a m anner as possible; at this particular period it was thought best not to be 
too rigid. Howe had his cue; officers released.”
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might be delivered to them, which of course was readily granted.92 
Gilbert’s diaiy, analogous to Greenman’s, contains numerous military justice actions and 
punishments, along with the c r im es .9 3  In addition to recording their adherence to military 
discipline, the soldiers noted their acts of compassion and ability to form bonds with fellow 
soldiers, and even the civilians they interacted with, on a daily b a s is .9 4
Martin sums up his ability to form bonds by relating his first meeting with his new 
soldiers once he was promoted to sergeant: "I had of course to form new acquaintances, but I was 
not long in doing that; I had a pretty free use of my tongue and was sometimes apt to use it when 
there was no occasion for it. However, I soon found myself at home with them."95 Martin saw his 
fellow soldiers as more than just workmates. He saw them as brothers.96 They looked after one 
another, as Martin recorded in the following episode: “I told him he should not die there nor 
anywhere else that day, if I could help it; and at length with more persuasion and some force I 
succeeded in getting him upon his feet again and to moving on.”97 Richards records a similar 
episode in his memoirs. “I left him recovering, my heart glowing with the reflection that I had 
been the instrum ent of saving a fellow man from immediate death.”98 Much like Martin, Richards 
referred to his comrades in arms as family.99 Greenman wrote several entries, which tracked the 
formation of bonds between men during periods of stress, and the resulting power of those bonds
92 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part II,” 272.
93 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 35. “Roger Alger of Capt. Shays Compy was whipt 50 Lashes 
for Stealing” and “This Morning one Smith formally Belonging to Colo. Greatons Regt was Shot to 
Death for Desertion and Inlisting severall tim es.”
94 Martin, A  Narrative, 83. Martin spent the majority of his time at Valley Forge as a member of 
foraging party obtaining supplies from reluctant farmers in the winter of 1777-1778. “But I will 
give them the credit of never receiving the least abuse or injury from an individual during the 
whole time I was employed in this business. I doubt whether the people of New England would 
have borne it as patiently, their ‘steady habits’ to the contrary notwithstanding.”
95 Ibid., 141.
96 Ibid., 203. “We had lived together as a family of brothers for several years (setting aside some 
little family squabbles, like most other families); had shared with each other the hardships, 
dangers, and sufferings incident to a soldiers life; had sympathize with each other in trouble and 
sickness; had assisted in bearing each other's burdens or strove to make them lighter by council 
and advice; had endeavored to conceal each other's faults and make them appear in as good a 
light as they would bear. In short, the soldiery, each in his particular circle of acquaintance, was as 
strict a band of brotherhood as Masons, and I believe, as faithful to each other.”
97 Ibid., 29.
98 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 221.
99 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part II,” 278.
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to lift their spirits.100 As the editor of Gilbert’s diary notes, “He was clearly a gregarious individual. 
W hether with his regiment or at home in Brookfield, he was constantly visiting neighbors or 
military comrades. He frequently mentions playing ball or "checors" and obviously raised many 
convivial glasses. When on leave, he seemed to spend as much time at friends' homes as with his 
family.”101 Gilbert served with men he knew from civilian life and this accounted for the lax 
discipline regarding fraternization within the Massachusetts regiment. Still, the shared sacrifices 
strengthened the bonds of the men and allowed Gilbert to hone his inter-personal skills for use in 
civilian pursuits after the war. While the bonds between soldiers reinforced their desire to fight 
for one another, they still acknowledged their part in a larger organization and purpose. 
Understanding the Bigger Picture
Although the soldiers recognized that their regiments were recruited from individual 
states, they identified with an American army and fighting for the country of America or the 
United States. The soldiers quoted above are representative of the travels that the Continental 
Army soldier undertook during the War. Joseph Plumb Martin and Benjamin Gilbert campaigned 
from Massachusetts to Virginia. Jerem iah Greenman fought from Quebec to Virginia. Ebenezer 
Denny marched from Pennsylvania to South Carolina. They traveled a large portion of the United 
States. If they were parochial or local in the outlook before their tours, service in the Continental 
Army forced them to see a larger entity.
Some scholars have downplayed the patriotic motivations or the sense of purpose of the 
Continental Army soldier in the years after 1775.102 They question whether the soldier had any 
concept of the United States or the country of America. The written words of the diaries kept
100 Greenman, Diary, 28. Greenman records an event that made an impression on him. At the 
beginning of the week, he was very despondent. At the end of the week, the British allowed the 
prisoners to get some exercise and play a team sport. "Keep o[u]r Selves ha[r]ty in playin ball in 
ye yard." The team sports and further bonding with his fellow prisoners improved his outlook.
The next week he wrote "these [days] very Contented hoping we shall go home in a little wile." 
Even though it was another three months before Greenman was paroled, he recorded lessons on 
the importance of forming bonds. W ithout formal training or an instruction manual, Greenman 
observed and recorded information on the forming and maintaining of a brotherhood as well as 
learning how to do it.
101 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 18.
102 Sellers, “Military History of the American Revolution,” 165. In 1974, John Sellers stated that he 
did not think that Privates fought with a true understanding of independence. He doubted the 
patriotic fervor of the Privates.
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during the war prove that the junior leaders knew they were fighting for the United States and not 
simply a paycheck. The two best indications of this understanding come from the accounts that 
underwent the least amount of postwar editing. While Martin, Denny, and Richards may have had 
similar thoughts at the time, their accounts were composed years after victory had been won. 
Greenman’s and Gilbert’s entries provide contemporary accounts that exhibit soldiers awareness 
that they were in service to the United States.
Patriotic fervor may not have been the sole or primary motivator for soldiers enlisting; 
however, once they had served in the Continental Army for a year or more, their diary entries 
reflect an understanding of the political idea of the United States or America. Individuals serving 
in the Continental Army realized they were part of a larger community because of their service. 
Levon Powell understood that he was part of an American army on November 7,1777 when he 
wrote his wife, “The affair the day before yesterday that not only does great honor to the American 
arms but will in my opinion be of infinite importance and its consequence. ”103 Jeremiah 
Greenman understood that he was part of the United States in May 1777 when he noted that 
“order for all our arms to be carried to town to have them stamped US.”1Q4 He further recorded on 
April 21,1778 when commenting “The town fired 13 rounds of Canon hearing that the French and 
Spaniards had declared us independent.”1^  Greenman is even more explicit on July 4,1781: “this
thday all the officers that are presant on the Island assembled, to commamorate the 4 July it 
being the anniversary of Independency and drank the 13 following 1st. United State of America 
maybe ever be independent & Suvering [sovereign],”106 Near the end of the war on July 4,1783,
Greenman records some final toasts: “2nc  ^The United States & their congress,...1 0 ^  May the 
characture of America never be sullied by Ingratitude to her delivers... ”107
Benjamin Gilbert saw the larger community after four years in the Continental Army 
when he wrote his family, “the providential trane of sircumstances which leat to it affords the
103 Leven Powell, “Leven Powell Papers” (Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, 
College of William and Mary, n.d.), November 7,1777, Special Collections Research Center, Swem 
Library, College of William and Mary.





most convincing proof that the liberties of america is the object of divine protection.”108 He 
referred to the liberties of America rather to his state or himself. He was not above taking swipes 
at other states, though. While campaigning in Virginia before the Battle of Yorktown, he wrote to 
a friend, “The country appears to be devoted to their services, and it is as hard a m atter to find a 
sincere frind to his country in this part of the state as it is to find a Tory in the state of 
Massachusetts Bay. ”109 Gilbert clearly imagined himself as part of a larger country and disparaged 
those individuals in states who did not support America. His private comments notwithstanding, 
his and the others’ ability to manage sectional and local differences benefited these leaders when 
they moved to new settings.
Within newly forming communities, the recently arrived soldiers possessed neither fame, 
social status, wealth, nor established connections in their new neighborhoods. It is doubtful that 
service alone in the Continental Army would have provided a significant advantage to any 
candidate for local positions of responsibility. Continental Army Soldiers were not venerated 
nationwide until 1818.110 Numerous studies have shown that soldiers did not get wealthy from 
their service in the war. They may have had bounty money or a land grant, but little else. They 
entered an emerging social situation formed with people from numerous backgrounds who were 
trying to establish communities where they could survive and possibly prosper. Fortunately for 
the noncommissioned officers and junior commissioned officers, this was familiar territory based 
on their military experience. Army service may not have made them  better farmers or merchants, 
but it did equip them with the skills necessary to form groups and survive under the rule of law. 
H is to r io g ra p h ic a l  C o n tr ib u tio n
Previous scholars made judgments on the postwar success of Continental Army soldiers 
primarily using the pension applications filed from 1818 to 1832. The justifications for public 
assistance listed on the pensions are not the final word on whether the soldiers were successful 
after the war. The lack of monetary means or land holdings was not unusual for individuals who
108 Gilbert, Winding Down, 22.
109 Ibid., 41.
110 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 1,4. “The country greeted them  with indifference; it quickly forgot 
them." and "By 1818, however, the nation embraced a new view of the Revolutionary War."
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lived into their old age.111 The need to provide dowries for daughters or inheritances for sons 
often depleted any monetary gains and divided farms into smaller parcels. Continental Army 
soldiers who first applied for pensions in 1818 would have been in their early sixties, which was 
past the prime for farm labor or other manual tasks. It is not surprising that they would have not 
been still working farms or engaging in heavy labor. Their material possessions would have been 
limited. Tools of the trade as well as farm implements and livestock would have been passed down 
to children or sold to the next generation.112 It is important to note that the claim was based on 
their contemporary economic well-being. What they had done in the previous 40 to 50 years was 
not a factor in determining awarding of a pension. This is the gap in analysis that previous 
historians have missed when arguing that military service in the Continental Army disadvantaged 
men in their postwar lives.
Some historians have pointed to the fact that soldiers moved from their hometowns soon 
after demobilization as evidence of the lack of economic prospects for former soldiers. This may 
have been true of all single men in their home towns, regardless of whether they served in the 
Army or not. It was certainly true in New England before the war.n 3 Other historians such as 
John Resch have highlighted the lack of economic and social mobility of returning veterans to 
established communities such as Peterborough, New Hampshire, as evidence of the deleterious 
effect of Continental Army service on men. The key fact in Resch’s analysis is the men were from 
all sections of a society with established social strata already in place. Men returned to a closed 
society that hindered upward movement. A few close kin networks controlled social and economic 
opportunity in Peterborough.1^  The assessments from Resch’s study are not universally 
applicable to all Continental Army veterans. Unfortunately, his work, referenced in most histories 
of the war published since 1999, was the last major work on soldiers after the war.
As fine a work as Resch's study is, it misses the more interesting story of what happened
111 Robert A. Gross, The M inutemen and Their World, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 
107. "Members of the older generation had no answers. They had their own anxieties. They were 
failing as parents: failing to pass on their property and status to the next generation, failing to 
direct their children to their proper roles in life...What would happen to them when they were old 
and in need of help?"
112 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 164. Description of retirement contracts.
n 3 Gross, The M inutemen and Their World, 87-89.
u4 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 16. "By 1775 many Peterborough families orbited around two large 
kin networks."
34
to Continental Army soldiers who did not return to their previous occupations in their hometowns 
after the war. Historians have noted that many demobilized soldiers moved west into newly 
available lands in the years after the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Unfortunately, historians have 
concluded that the soldiers met with further ostracization and economic failure based on their 
pension applications. However, the evidence suggests that the soldiers put to use the skills in 
leadership learned in the Continental Army to obtain positions of trust in their new communities. 
This was especially true of non-commissioned officers and junior officers who obtained their rank 
in the army through merit.
Postwar Contributions
As a former sergeant, Joseph Plumb Martin put his army skills to work over the next fifty 
years in Maine. As a biography sketch noted in 1876: “In securing an act of incorporation for his 
adopted town, in reducing the place to system and order as a civil community, he bore a 
prominent part. He held various stations of trust, being repeatedly selectmen, representative to 
the state legislature, and for over a quarter of a century town clerk. ”ns These positions of trust 
hardly seem like the mark of a failure. Martin moved from his birthplace, where he evidently had 
little chance of prosperity, to an unsettled area of the future state of Maine, and made his mark.
Greenman experienced financial disappointment when he returned to his hometown and 
attempted to make a living as a shopkeeper. When shop keeping did not provide an adequate 
living, he entered the merchant marine where he made a num ber of voyages. He eventually got his 
m aster’s certificate and began to captain vessels. Greenman also kept up a steady barrage of 
letters to friends and acquaintances to secure employment in a federal position or a commission 
in the new Army. Neither of these two courses of action came to fruition, so in 1806, he moved to 
Ohio to take advantage of his bounty land and become a farmer. The land he settled on was not 
ideal for raising crops, but he established himself in the community. Within six years, he was 
repeatedly elected the township justice of the peace.116 While Greenman was a landowner, he 
clearly was not a wealthy farmer. His skills, developed and honed in the army, convinced his new
ns Joseph Williamson, “Biographical Sketch of Joseph P. Martin, of Prospect, Maine, A 
Revolutionary Soldier,” The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register (1874-1905), 
July 1876.
116 Greenman, Diary, xvi-xxvii.
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neighbors that he could be trusted with a position of authority.
Of the five individuals examined in this paper, Ebenezer Denny had the greatest success 
after the war in employing his skills learned while in service. Denny continued in the Army and 
served in several campaigns in the Northwest Territory. He eventually made Major. His post­
military career was just as successful. Denny settled in the area around Fort Pitt. Neighbors 
elected him a county commissioner and to the state legislature in 1797. In 1804, business 
associates appointed him director of the Bank of Pennsylvania, which later became a branch of 
the Bank of the United States.11? When the Pennsylvania legislature incorporated Pittsburgh in 
1816, Denny was elected the first mayor.118 His military service and skills contributed to earning 
all these positions of trust. Denny is another example of a Revolutionary War soldier who was not 
broken by service, but actually thrived because of it.
Samuel Richards’ story after the war differs from the others in one critical detail. Because 
he obtained a federal position, Postmaster General of Farmington, Connecticut, he did not have to 
move to provide for his family. His long military service in the Connecticut regiment from the 
beginning to the end of the war did allow him to develop a network of friends and supporters. He 
honed his ability to manage men and developed a patronage network, which assisted his efforts to 
garner a plum federal job. However, his efforts were not entirely self-serving. In his community, 
he served as a deacon for his local church for a number of years and lent his talents to assisting 
soldiers to receive pensions. As a deacon in his local congregation, his fellow worshipers thought 
he exhibited all the qualities listed in the Bible’s 1 Timothy 3:1-13. Richards clearly had their trust 
and he maintained trust with his fellow soldiers as shown by his work with their pensions. 
Richards was successful in his postwar career in his birth community due to a federal job, but he 
still put his army-developed skills to use in his community.
Benjamin Gilbert’s postwar life almost matches the success of Denny’s accomplishments. 
Gilbert moved to an undeveloped portion of New York near Otsego Lake. He helped form 
Montgomery County in 1791, was appointed sheriff in 1792, and served in the position for ten of 
the next eleven years. Elected positions include supervisor from 1803-1809 and 1812-1816. Other
n 7 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f  M ajor Ebenezer Denny, 7:229.
118 Ibid., 7:234.
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duties included justice of the peace, surveyor, and town clerk. Gilbert’s diary indicated a very 
social man who liked the company of others, male and female. He was also a Mason and helped 
found the Otsego Lodge in Cooperstown .n 9 While these qualities and connections certainly helped 
his rise, the experience and skills learned during extended service in the Continental Army proved 
the critical element. Familiarity with the application of justice and experience as a quarterm aster 
and supplies would have proved invaluable in the chartering of a new town and the management 
of resources and people. The Continental Army prepared Gilbert well for his civilian pursuits after 
demobilization.
Conclusion
The review of postwar life completes the examination of the five subjects. The soldiers’ 
unpresuming origins before enlistment identified none destined or marked for greatness. In fact, 
any potential at all for the individuals to advance into leadership positions would have been 
doubtful. Their memoirs reveal men changed by their time in the Army. Entries describing their 
first times in combat disclosed scared men who learned to face their fears and deal with uncertain 
situations. This ability proved beneficial to those embarking on journeys to new towns and 
establishing law and order. They received training in the army that went beyond on-the-job 
observation. Through personal training by von Steuben or his disciples and a clearly written 
manual, they learned the tenets of being a good leader. As they continued through their careers, 
they made note of episodes that proved their competence. These hard won skills furnished the 
ability and confidence to shoulder positions of trust. Enough evidence exists to argue military 
service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders with skills critical to their postwar 
success when they moved to new communities as the nation expanded.
More was needed than solely learning how to march, fire a musket, and follow orders, 
which would have been familiar to soldiers of any army of the time. Due to unique circumstances, 
the United States had to form a cadre of junior leaders to man its professional units. Through a 
combination of long-term service, von Steuben’s manual and training program, and merit-based 
promotions, the Continental Army created a competent corps of sergeants, lieutenants, and
n 9 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 16-17.
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captains. While militarily competent and tactically proficient in drill and maneuver, these junior 
leaders also left the army with skills they could transfer to civilian pursuits. Their diaries and 
letters show they understood the changes they had undergone while fighting in the war. When 
matched against the tenets written in von Steuben’s manual, there emerged a remarkable 
correlation. The writers believed they had met the standards of what von Steuben’s manual 
required of junior leaders and they wanted to record their success. The tone of the memoirs 
composed after the war clearly attributed their postwar success to lessons learned during service. 
Individual editors of the diaries used in this study noted their subjects’ postwar success and the 
impact of service. What has been missing from the histories is a study of a sizable portion of the 
former veteran junior leaders as they moved to new communities during the early Republic’s 
expansion. Over half of the demobilized veterans moved from their birth locations or places of 
enlistment. A substantial number moved west into the newly forming states. The sources used in 
this paper show that these individuals had much in common. Further research is possible on 
those individuals who did not bequeath fully formed memoirs or completed diaries to historians. 
Sources of biographical data such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the pension 
applications provide excellent repositories to identify other junior leaders and reconstruct their 
postwar lives. The period after the Revolutionary War saw one of the greatest expansions of the 
nation. Eleven states were settled, organized, and admitted into the union by 1821.120 Between 
1783 and 1821 would have been the prime years for junior leaders to contribute to their 
communities. The former soldiers may not have been financially successful in their later years, 
but their contributions to the growth of the United States may have been overlooked. This study 
clearly demonstrates that further work is needed to illuminate the junior leaders’ continued 
service to their country.
120 Eleven additional states were admitted into the union by 1821 after the original 13 ratified the 
US Constitution in 1787. (Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, 
Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri.) It would be fifteen years until the next state, Arkansas, 
entered the union in 1836.
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